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[Abstract: We show that the common claim that internal validity should be understood as 
prior to external validity has, at least, three epistemologically problematic aspects: 
experimental artefacts, the implications of causal relations, and how the mechanism is 
measured. Each aspect demonstrates how important external validity is for the internal 
validity of the experimental result.] 
 
1) Internal and external validity: perceived tension and claimed priority 
Donald T. Campbell introduced the concepts internal and external validity in the 1950s. 
Originally designed for research related to personality and personality change, the use of 
this conceptual pair was soon extended to educational and social research. Since then it has 
spread to many more disciplines. 
Without a doubt the concepts captures two features of research scientists are aware of in 
their daily practice. Researchers aim to make correct inferences both about that which is 
actually studied (internal validity), for instance in an experiment, and about what the 
results ‘generalize to’ (external validity). Whether or not the language of internal and 
external validity is used in their disciplines, the tension between these two kinds of 
inference is often experienced.  
In addition, it is often claimed that one of the two is prior to the other. And the sense in 
which internal validity is often claimed to be prior to external validity is both temporal and 
epistemic, at least. For instance, Francisco Guala claims that:  
“Problems of internal validity are chronologically and epistemically antecedent to 
problems of external validity: it does not make much sense to ask whether a result is valid 
outside the experimental circumstances unless we are confident that it does therein” 
(Guala, 2003, 1198). 
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The claim about temporal priority is that we first make inferences about the local 
environment under study before making inferences about the surrounding world. The claim 
about epistemic priority is that we come to know the local environment before we come to 
know the surrounding world. 
In the following we problematize the relation between external and internal validity. Our 
claim is that the two types of validity are deeply intertwined. However, we are not going to 
attempt to argue for the full claim. We argue only in favour of the part of the claim that is 
in conflict with the idea behind the internal/external distinction. The argument is directed 
at showing that internal validity understood as prior to external validity has, at least, three 
epistemologically problematic aspects: experimental artefacts, the implications of causal 
relations, and how the mechanism is measured. We exemplify the problems associated 
with experimental artefacts and mechanism measurement by cases from experimental 
psychology. Each aspect demonstrates how important external validity is for the internal 
validity of the experimental result.  
We end the paper by presenting a different kind of test. Lee Cronbach claims that internal 
validity, as interpreted by the later Campbell, is a rather meaningless feature of scientific 
results. If we are right, a Cronbachian attack on internal validity in general must also be 
mistaken. Since on our understanding internal and external validity are intertwined a 
successful attack on internal validity would threaten to have adverse effects on external 
validity. To be consistent with our standpoint the particular conception Cronbach attacks 
should pinpoint other features than the concept of internal validity has traditionally been 
assumed to capture. 
 
2) What is internal and external validity? 
It is impossible to evaluate whether the perceived tension and the claimed priority of 
internal validity are justified unless we know more precisely what it is that we make 
internally valid inferences about and what this validity is supposed to consist in. Below we 
present three formulations of internal and external validity:  
Campbell’s early conception: “First, and as a basic minimum, is what can be called 
internal validity: did in fact the experimental stimulus make some significant difference in 
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this specific instance? The second criterion is that of external validity, representativeness, 
or generalizability: to what populations, settings, and variables can this effect be 
generalized?” (Campbell 1957, 297).  
Guala’s recent conception: “Internal validity is achieved when the structure and behavior 
of a laboratory system (its main causal factors, the ways they interact, and the phenomena 
they bring about) have been properly understood by the experimenter. For example: the 
result of an experiment E is internally valid if the experimenter attributes the production of 
an effect B to a factor (or set of factors) A, and A really is the (or a) cause of B in E. 
Furthermore, it is externally valid if A causes B not only in E, but also in a set of other 
circumstances of interest, F, G, H, etc.” (Guala 2003, 1198).  
Campbell’s later conception: “In the new contrast, external […] validity involve[s] theory. 
Local molar causal validity [, i.e. internal validity,] does not. While this contrast is 
weakened in the principle of proximal similarity [i.e. external validity], I still want to retain 
it. The principle of proximal similarity is normally (and it should be) implemented on the 
basis of expert intuition. […] Our intuitive expectations about what dimensions are 
relevant are theory-like, even if they are not formally theoretical. Moreover, clinical 
experience, prior experimental results, and formal theory are very appropriate guides for 
efforts to make the exploration of the bounds of generalizability more systematic.” 
(Campbell 1986, 76) 
Campbell’s early conception and Guala’s conception show similarity in how they 
understand external validity. It is about how to generalize what has been found internally. 
Campbell’s later conception differs from both in that the connection between local causal 
claims and general claims is weakened. The word “local” emphasizes that the claimed 
validity is limited to “the context of particular treatments, outcomes, times, settings, and 
persons studied” (Shadish et al. 2002, 54). Local causal claims are “molar” as well. 
Campbell exemplifies it in the following way: “For the applied scientist, local molar causal 
validity is a first crucial issue and the starting point for the other validity questions. For 
example, did this complex treatment package make a real difference in this unique 
application at this particular place and time?” (Campbell 1986, 69). There is no guarantee 
that molar claims refer directly to a potential cause. A true molar claim entails merely that 
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something in the complex it captures is a cause. The difference between Campbell’s later 
conception and Guala’s conception is considerable in that respect. Guala’s internal validity 
requires that we understand the causal mechanism that operates in the local case. The later 
Campbell explicitly opposes such a view as generally true of internal validity. Applied 
scientists also need internal validity, but they can normally not analyse causation with such 
precision; “to stay with our problems, we must use techniques that, while improving the 
validity of our research, nonetheless provide less clarity of causal inference than would a 
retreat to narrowly specified variables under laboratory control” (Campbell 1986, 70-71). 
The difference between Campbell’s earlier and later understanding of internal validity 
seems to be one of emphasis primarily. However, the difference between their views of 
external validity is more significant. External validity is not in general established through 
representative sampling, and it is not a matter of simple inductive generalisation. First, a 
cause has to be extracted from the molar situation and then the causal relation is exported 
to proximally similar cases. 
For each of these conceptions there are epistemologically problematic aspects of internal 
validity. We will focus on three: experimental artefacts, the implications of causal 
relations, and the measurement of mechanism. 
 
3) Epistemology—the problem of experimental artefacts  
Can there be such a thing as an internally valid inference? That clearly depends on whether 
the methods we use guarantee that we see clearly, i.e. that what we see in the local 
environment is not in fact an artefact of something else. But some well-known “internally 
valid” results have in fact been generated by, for instance, the method of randomization or 
measurement used.  
 
3a) Overconfidence—experimental artefacts 
Overconfidence is a psychological phenomenon that refers to an overrating of the 
correctness of one’s judgements. Typically, participants are asked knowledge questions 
such as “Which city has more inhabitants? Hyderabad or Islamabad?” and are asked to rate 
how confident they are that their answer on this particular question is correct on a scale 
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from 50% to 100%. Overconfidence occurs when the mean subjective probability assigned 
to how correct responses are is higher than the proportion of correct answers. In contrast a 
participant is calibrated if:  “…over the long run, for all propositions assigned a given 
probability, the proportion that is true equals the probability assigned” (Lichtenstein, 
Fischhoff and Philips, 1982). 
The overconfidence effect can, however, be made to disappear under certain experimental 
conditions. Some authors (e.g., Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and Kleinbölting, 1991; Juslin, 1994) 
have claimed that the overconfidence effect is simply an effect of unrepresentative 
sampling. The basic idea behind the critique is that participants need a certain amount of 
information in order to make a correct estimate of their performance on a task. When this 
is not available, they will instead draw on their more general knowledge of the area. If I 
have no clear intuition on whether Islamabad or Hyderabad is the biggest city in the 
question above, I might use the knowledge I have of my general competency in geography 
or what I know about the capitals of Asian countries to produce a confidence judgement. 
That means that if the knowledge questions are sampled in a skewed way so that they 
contain more difficult questions than are normally encountered, participants will exhibit 
overconfidence (i.e. miscalibration). If the knowledge questions posed are instead 
randomly sampled from representative environments, the overconfidence effect disappears 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Juslin, 1994).  
The early experiments investigating overconfidence were clearly internally valid in the 
sense that results were robust: The experimental stimuli produced judgments that had the 
properties of overconfidence. However, they appear to be experimental artefacts, and slight 
variations in the experimental set up will change the results. There are, however, even 
more serious allegations against overconfidence – allegations that are especially interesting 
in this context. In a second set of critique against overconfidence authors such as Ido Erev 
(Erev, Wallsten and Budescu, 1994) and Peter Juslin (Juslin, Winman and Olson, 2000) 
claim that overconfidence (and the related hard-easy effect which we will not discuss here) 
is a product of regression towards the mean. Overconfidence occurs because a participant 
responding to a difficult task (as the one described above) is more likely to overestimate 
correctness than underestimating it. In the extreme, a participant that responds at a chance 
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level cannot be underconfident given the scale 50% to 100% certain that the response is 
correct. This explains also why the representatively sampled knowledge questions (of 
intermediate difficulty) made the overconfidence effect disappear. The artefact is not 
produced by the knowledge questions as such, but depend rather on features inherent in the 
experimental situation: it is difficult to conceptualize a scale measuring certainty that 
would not have endpoints such as these.  
 
4) Epistemology—the problem of causation 
Whether there can be an internally valid inference also depends on the nature of what is 
inferred to. Normally, as we have seen in 2) the inference is causal. Now, there are many 
concepts of causation. Some of these are clearly of a kind that does not support inferences 
that are primarily internally. For instance, someone operating with a notion of causation 
similar to one of those that Kant, Hume, or Mill relied on will judge internally valid 
inferences to causal matters impossible. For each of those causal concepts the implications 
of causation, regardless of whether it has to do with the notion of sufficiency or necessity, 
go beyond the local environment. If there is a causal relation in the local environment it 
follows that this holds also outside this environment. And, trivially, it holds that if it does 
not hold outside the environment it cannot hold inside either. Hence such concepts of 
causation warrant neither the alleged temporal nor epistemological priority of internal 
validity. 
It is in fact a long distance between traditional causal concepts and causation that is 
suitable for being primarily internally validly inferred to. However, more than one 
advocate of randomised controlled trials adopts a view on which an intervention study 
underwrites a positive causal inference. Consider the following quote from David 
Papineau: 
“You take a sample of people with the disease. You divide them into two groups at 
random. You give one group the treatment, withhold it from the other [...] and judge on 
this basis whether the probability of recovery in the former group is higher. If it is, then T 
[treatment] must now cause R [recovery], for the randomization will have eliminated the 
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danger of any confounding factors which might be responsible for a spurious correlation.” 
(Papineau 1994, 439) 
This is excessively optimistic for reasons having to do with the possible artefacts of 
randomization (cf. Shadish et al., 2002, Ch. 2) and the more general points that we have 
already pressed, but that is, not the present point. Let us assume that randomization is 
successful in the desired respect. Papineau’s modified position seems to rely on a concept 
of causation given which in the relevant cases causation is entailed by (i.e. is 
unproblematically inferable from) the fact that the relative frequency of R in the 
intervention group is higher than it is in the control. Thus, for instance, the concept of 
cause employed is not that causes are sufficient in the circumstances, nor that they are 
necessary. This is plainly not so since neither kind of causation is entailed by the 
experimental fact (cf. Persson 2009).  
 
5) Epistemology—the measurement of mechanism 
How mechanisms are measured has a strong impact on the results obtained. As we saw in 
the case of overconfidence the choice of measurements can have unintended side effects, 
but the relation between how stimuli are presented and the effects that are measured is 
more complex than so. An interesting example comes from psychophysics and concerns 
range effects, i.e., effects due to the fact that participants receive more than one 
experimental condition.  
 
5a) Range effects– the measurement of mechanism 
Poulton (1975) presents a number of different range effects demonstrating how the order in 
which stimuli is presented in itself affect the result, or the type of mechanism that is being 
observed (an “unbiased” perceptual judgment, or judgments mediated by range effects – in 
themselves mechanisms).  We will use the simplest example, where the range in which a 
stimulus is presented influences how far apart different stimuli are judged to be. In the case 
of Figure 1 the slope of perceived distances between stimuli is radically different when the 
end points are L1 and L2, rather than S1 and S2 when ∅ represents the physical magnitude 
and ψ the subjective (perceived) magnitude. 
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[INSERT FIGURE 1 POULTON; SEE LAST PAGE] 
Figure 1. Adapted from Poulton, 1968.  
 
Since participants’ pre-conceptions of what the range of stimuli is will affect their 
responses, the “external validity” of the stimuli (in this context how well the range it 
introduces, or the range the experimenter assumes, matches participants’ pre-conceived 
range of stimuli) determines whether the results obtained in the laboratory correctly 
capture the features of the mechanism operating there. Hence, in cases like these, external 
validity is a requirement for internal validity. Note that this potentially false estimate of the 
function has prefect internal validity. Given the range, the stimuli really do cause the 
response, and we have a fair grasp of what the mechanisms are.  
Poulton himself, however, treats the results differently than we do: “All experimental data 
are not equally valuable. A theoretical model is unlikely to be better than the data which 
has shaped it. If data are of restricted validity as a result of unrepresentative sampling or 
the independent variables or of uncontrolled transfer effects, a model based upon the data 
is not likely to have great generality. This is the case however much data the model can fit, 
provided all the data has been generated using the same inadequate techniques of sampling 
or experimentation” (Poulton 1968, 1). We do not disagree with Poulton, but in contrast to 
him we emphasize that the core issue here is how internal validity is to be guaranteed 
unless range effects are properly understood. And this will happen only when extra-
experimental factors (such as participants’ pre conception of the range that is to be 
introduced) are properly understood. Thus we would like to maintain that the case of the 
perceptual mechanisms at the mercy of range effects internal and external validity cannot 
be treated as separate entities.  
 
6. The difficulty of adapting systems 
A straightforward extension of the above observations about the co-dependence of external 
and internal validity is to be found in Egon Brunswik’s work on representativeness. What 
he adds to the discussion is a focus on the difficulties in observing an organism that adapts 
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to the circumstances in which it exists: “The concept inherent in functionalism that 
psychology is the science dealing with the adjustment of organisms to the environment in 
which they actually live suggest the need of testing any obtained stimulus-response 
relationship in such a way that the habitat of the individual, group, or species is represented 
with all of its variables, and that the specific values of these variables are kept in 
accordance with the frequencies in which they actually happen to be distributed.” 
(Brunswik, 1944, 69).   
Note, however, that here the focus is exclusively on the adaptive character of human 
cognition (in Brunswik’s case the perceptual system). If the aim of an experiment in 
psychology is to understand the functioning of different psychological mechanisms (in the 
form of stimulus-response relations), then the quality of this finding is just as dependent on 
whether the psychological mechanism has been properly activated as it is on whether the 
results can be replicated. This is not only a question about how the result will generalize to 
other settings (external validity) – it is a question about whether a proper result has at all 
been generated (internal validity). Thus, for psychological mechanisms that can be 
assumed to have an adaptive character, external validity (or certain aspects of it) appears to 
be prior to internal validity: It is more important that an experiment measures what it aims 
to measure than that the result internally valid.  
 
6a Is the study object human cognition or the environment? 
Egon Brunswik is one of the psychologists that have most clearly advanced the idea that 
external validity has to be taken into account if we are to understand the human mind at all. 
In his own words:  “psychology has forgotten that it is a science of organism-environment 
relationships, and has become a science of the organism” (Brunswik, 1957, 6). His remedy 
to this difficulty was the notion of representative design (Brunswik, 1955), and, in 
particular, his use of representative sampling while studying perceptual constants 
(Brunswik 1944). 
In his 1944 study, Brunswik wanted to understand whether the retinal size of an object 
could be used to predict its actual size. In order to establish the relationship between retinal 
size and object size, participants were followed for several weeks and stopped at random 
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intervals. For whatever object they were looking at, at that point, retinal size, object size, 
and distance were measured. Since the objects taken into account were the objects actually 
attended to by participants in their daily environments, Brunswik could estimate the real-
life predictive power of retinal size for object size. His conclusion was that the retinal size 
had some predictive power regardless of the distance to the object.  
Note that Brunswik’s method as described here is only a method for understanding the 
environment. In order to explain how participants judge the size of objects, it has to be 
combined with a demonstration that retinal size is used to predict object size. However, the 
controlled experiment that can be used to test this hypothesis will not help us understand 
how predictive retinal size is of object size. This requires a method such as Brunswik’s. 
Note also that the method of representative sampling is only possible in so far as the 
researcher already has a clear understanding of the cognitive process under investigation. 
Unless we have some idea of which aspects of the environment are accessed by the 
cognitive mechanism, methodological shortcuts such as representative sampling are not 
possible. Simply stated, we have to know what to measure in order to measure it, also 
when the measurement is done through random sampling. Campbell, of course, notes this 
problematic issue in the context of random sampling of participants (note the difference in 
emphasis). He points out that: “… the validity of generalizations to other persons, settings, 
and future (or past) times would be a function of the validity of the theory involved, plus 
the accuracy of the theory-relevant knowledge of the persons, settings, and future periods 
to which one wanted to generalize […]. This perspective has already moved us far from 
the widespread concept that one can solve generalizability problems by representative 
sampling from a universe specified in advance” (Campbell 1986, 71).  
Also other methodologically inclined psychologists have reflected upon the co dependency 
of the environment and the agent. Often this is conceptualized as the difficulty of 
understanding whether what is being observed is a feature of the participant’s internal 
processing or a feature of the task environment. Thus Ward Edwards (1971) observes that:  
“My own guess is that most successful models now available [in psychology] are 
successful exactly because of their success in describing tasks, not people …modelling 
tasks is different from modelling people, [we need] to hunt for tools for modelling tasks, 
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and to provide linkages between models of tasks and models of people”. And this difficulty 
has it roots in precisely the difficulty of making controlled experiments that observe 
features of a cognitive system designed for adapting to the circumstances. Or in 
Campbell’s own words: “Both criteria [external and internal validity] are obviously 
important although it turns out that they are to some extent incompatible, in that the 
controls required for internal validity often tend to jeopardize representativeness” 
(Campbell 1957, 297).  
 
7) Cronbach’s challenge 
Let us now set the objections against the possibility of internally valid inferences aside. Let 
us grant that the problems of randomization, measurement and causation can be dissolved 
by appropriate adaptive measures. Even so the question whether internal validity should be 
given priority remains: 
“I consider it pointless to speak of causes when all that can be validly meant by reference 
to a cause in a particular instance is that, on one trial of a partially specified manipulation t 
under conditions A, B, and C, along with other conditions not named, phenomenon P was 
observed. To introduce the word cause seems pointless. Campbell’s writings make internal 
validity a property of trivial, past-tense, and local statements.” (Cronbach 1982, 137) 
Cronbach’s point translates nicely to what we have argued here. To the extent that there is 
a variety of causation that can be fully examined in such a way that it underwrites a 
positive causal inference—for instance, by a randomized controlled trial—then that variety 
of causation is not very scientifically valuable. What should we do with these past tense, 
local statements concerning highly artificial experimental contexts? They seem trivial as 
scientific results. The only way this kind of trivial causal statements could prove useful is 
if they connect with more substantial ones. In other words, internal validity of this kind 
could have a value in relation to external validity as providing one of the instances 
externally valid claims have to be true about. Now, internal validity is not prior to external 
validity in any interesting sense. If anything, it seems secondary. It should be noted that 
Campbell (1986, 70) acknowledges this: “The theories and hunches used by those who put 
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the therapeutic package together must, of course, be regarded as corroborated, however 
tentatively, if there is an effect of local, molar validity in the expected direction”. 
However, this relationship between internal and external validity is important. Cronbach’s 
challenge might be reconstructed as a counter argument to our claim that internal and 
external validity are intertwined. It might be constructed as the view that internal validity is 
redundant. As we have seen our response is: 1) to the extent that the causation internal 
validity concerns is substantial, external validity is needed as part of the evidence; 2) to the 
extent that the causation is of a trivial form, this kind of causation might still be important 
as one of the instances that is needed to prove external validity. (There is, of course, a third 
possibility as well, that all genuine causation is local.) 
 
8) Priorities reconsidered 
However critical we have been of attempts to prioritize internal validity, there is a last 
argument that can be made in its favour, and it is elegantly (and fittingly) made by 
Campbell in the following passage: “If one is in a situation where either internal validity or 
representativeness must be sacrificed, which should it be? The answer is clear. Internal 
validity is the prior and indispensable consideration. The optimal design is, of course, one 
having both internal and external validity. Insofar as such settings are available, they 
should be exploited, without embarrassment from the apparent opportunistic warping of 
the content of studies by the availability of laboratory techniques. In this sense, a science is 
as opportunistic as a bacteria culture and grows only where growth is possible. One basic 
necessity for such growth is the machinery for selecting among alternative hypotheses, no 
matter how limited those hypotheses may have to be.” (Campbell 1957, 310). Although we 
do not believe that internal and external validity can be treated separately – or even chosen 
between in the way suggested by Campbell – we fully agree that scientific research will 
have to take whatever routes are available.  
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